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List of Terminal Identifiers

Terminal Identifiers

The following tables matches Terminal numerical IDs (telenet parmater 23)
Generic and Specific Terminal Identifiers.

ID # Generic Term ID Terminal Type (note)
—- ——- ——- —————————

0 Unknown or Synch. Host
1 B1 AJ63 Anderson Jacobson 630
2 B5 AJ86 Anderson Jacobson 860 (9)
3 A2 CD30 CDI 1030
4 D1 DP22 Datapoint 2200
5 D2 DP30 Datapoint 3000 & 3300
6 D3 HP21 Hewlett-Packard 2100s (9)
7 A2 CT30 CT Execuport 300
9 A4 GE30 GE Terminet 300
10 A3 GE12 GE Terminet 1200
11 D1 HZ20 Hazeltine 2000
12 E1 IBM1 2741 EBCD (5)
13 E2 IBM2 2741 EBCD (6)
14 E3 IBM3 2741 EBCD (7)
15 E4 IBM4 2741 EBCD (8)
16 C1 IBM5 2741 Correspondence (1)
17 C2 IBM6 2741 Correspondence (2)
18 C3 IBM7 2741 Correspondence (3)
19 C4 IBM8 2741 Correspondence (4)
20 D1 T4/2 Special Terminal
26 A1 TT33 Teletype 33
27 A1 TT35 Teletype 35
30 D1 TT40 Teletype 40
32 A7 TI25 TI 725
33 A2 TI33 TI 733 (Default)
34 A6 TI45 TI 735
35 B2 UV50 Univac DCT 500
38 D1 IFVD Infoton Vistar Display
39 D1 RI34 Teleray 3300-3700
40 A5 TN30 GE Terminet 30
41 A8 DECW DEC LA35/36 Decwriter II
43 A3 TN12 GE Terminet 120
44 A9 CT12 CT Execuport 1200
45 A1 Generic Terminal
46 A2 Generic Terminal
47 A3 Generic Terminal
48 A4 Generic Terminal
49 A5 Generic Terminal
50 A6 Generic Terminal
51 A7 Generic Terminal
52 A8 Generic Terminal
53 A9 Generic Terminal
54 D1 ADDS ADDS 520, 580, 980
55 B3 AJ83 AJ 830 & 832
56 B1 Generic Terminal
57 B2 Generic Terminal
59 D1 BHMB Beehive MiniBee 2
60 C1 Generic Terminal
61 C2 Generic Terminal
62 C3 Generic Terminal
63 C4 Generic Terminal
64 D1 CD11 CDI 1132
65 A2 CD12 CDI 1202 & 1203
66 D1 Generic Terminal
67 D2 Generic Terminal
68 D1 DECV DEC VT50 & VT52
69 D1 DGLG Digi-Log 33, Telecomputer I
70 A1 DPPT Data Products Portaterm
71 B3 DS16 Diablo 1550 & 1620
72 E1 Generic Terminal
73 E2 Generic Terminal
74 E3 Generic Terminal
75 E4 Generic Terminal
76 B3 GS30 Gen-Comm Systems 300
77 D1 HP26 HP 2640, 2644, 2645
78 D1 LSAM Lear Siegler ADM1, 2, 3
79 A2 NC60 NCR 260
80 B1 TD40 Trendata 4000
81 D1 TI45 TI 745
82 D2 TI65 TI 763, 765 (10)
83 D1 TK40 Tektronix 4002-4023
84 B3 TT43 Teletype 43
85 A3 WU30 Western Union EDT 30
86 A4 WU12 Western Union EDT 1200
87 B3 DT30 Data Term & Comm DCT 300-30 2
88 B3 Generic Terminal
89 B4 Generic Terminal
90 B5 Generic Terminal (9)
91 D3 Generic Terminal (9)
127 Asynchronous Hosts

The following are terminal models with corresponding generic terminal
types supported by the terminal handler.

Terminal Model ID (note)
————————————- ———

ADDS Consul 520, 580, 980 D1 (1)
ADDS Envoy 620, Regent D1 (1)
Alanthus Data Terminal T-133 A1
T-300 A8
T-1200 A3
Alanthus Miniterm A2
AM-Jacquard Amtext 425 D1 (1)
Anderson Jacobsen 510 D1 (1)
Anderson Jacobsen 630 B1
Anderson Jacobsen 830 & 832 B3 (2)
Anderson Jacobsen 860 B5
Apple II D1 (1)
Atari 400, 800 D1 (1)
AT&T Dataspeed 40/1, 40/2, 40/3 D1 (1)
Beehive MiniBee, MicroBee D1 (1)
Centronics 761 A8
Commodore Pet D1 (1)
Compu-Color II D1 (1)
Computer Devices CDI 1030 A2
Computer Devices Teleterm 1132 A8
Computer Devices Miniterm 1200 series A2
Computer Transceiver Execuport 300 A2
Computer Transceiver Execuport 1200 A2
Computer Transceiver Execuport 4000 A2
CPT 6000, 8000 D1 (1)
Datamedia Elite D1 (1)
Datapoint 1500, 1800, 2200, 3000, 3300,
3600, 3800 D1 (1)
Data Products Portaterm A1
Data Terminal & Comm DTC 300, 302 B3 (2)
Diablo Hyterm B3 (2)
Digi-log 33 & Telecomputer II D1 (1)
DEC (LA 35-36) Decwriter II A8
DEC (LA 120) Decwriter III A8
DEC VT50, VT52, VT100, WS78, WS200 D1 (1)
Gen-Comm Systems 300 B3 (2)
GE Terminet 30 A5
GE Terminet 120, 1200 A3
GE Terminet 300 A4
General Terminal GT-100A, GT-101, GT-110,
GT-400, GT-400B D1 (1)
Hazeltine 1500, 1400, 2000 D1 (1)
Hewlett Packard 2621 D3
Hewlett Packard 2640 series D1 (1)
IBM PC (and compatibles) D1 (1)
IBM 3101 D1 (1)
Informer I304, D304 D1 (1)
Infoton 100, 200, 400, Vistar D1 (1)
Intelligent Systems Intecolor D1 (1)
Intertex Intertube II D1 (1)
Lanier Word Processor D1 (1)
Lear Siegler ADM series D1 (1)
Lexitron 1202, 1303 D1 (1)
Memorex 1240 A2
Micom 2000, 2001 D1 (1)
NBI 3000 D1 (1)
NCR 260 A2
Perkin-Elmer Model 110, Owl, Bantam D1 (1)
Perkin-Elmer Carousel 300 Series A8
Radio Shack TRS 80 D1 (1)
Research Inc. Teleray D1 (1)
Tektronix 4002-4023 D1 (1)
Teletype Model 33, 35 A1
Teletype Model 40 D1 (1)
Teletype Model 43 B3 (2)
Teletype Model 40/1, 40/2, 40/3 D1 (1)
Texas Instrument 725 A7
733 A2
735 A6
743, 745, 763, 765 D1 (1)
820 B3 (2)
99/4 D1 (1)
Trendata 4000 (ASCII) B1
Tymshare 110, 212 A2
315 A8
325 B3 (2)
Univac DCT 500 B4
WANG 20, 25, 30, 105, 130, 145 D1 (1)
Western Union EDT 30, 35 A1
300 A4
1200 A4
XEROX 800, 850, 860 D1 (1)
XEROX 1700 B3 (2)

Notes: (1) Use D3 if you wish Telenet to respond to XON/XOFF
flow control.
(2) Use B5 if you wish Telenet to respond to XON/XOFF
flow control.

The following are the major characteristics of the generic terminal
types supported by the terminal handler:

Generic Tab LF CR Pad CR Pad Line Code
Pad Pad Fixed Var’bl Size Type (note)
——- — — —— —— —- ———————–

A1 0 1 0 0 72 ASCII
A2 0 2 7 0 80 ASCII
A3 0 0 0 0 120 ASCII – Printer
A4 0 6 0 0 120 ASCII
A5 0 5 5 0 120 ASCII
A6 0 0 1 1 80 ASCII
A7 0 4 0 2 80 ASCII
A8 2 0 1 0 132 ASCII
A9 12 10 16 6 132 ASCII

B1 1 0 2 1 132 ASCII–BUFFERED
B2 0 2 6 0 132 ASCII–BUFFERED
B3 0 0 0 0 132 ASCII–BUFFERED
B4 0 2 10 0 132 ASCII–BUFFERED
B5 0 0 0 0 132 ASCII–BUFFERED (9)

C1 1 1 4 1 130 2741 Correspondence (1)
C2 1 1 4 1 130 2741 Correspondence (2)
C3 1 1 4 1 130 2741 Correspondence (3)
C4 1 1 4 1 130 2741 Correspondence (4)

D1 0 0 0 0 80 ASCII–CRT
D2 0 0 0 0 72 ASCII–CRT
D3 0 0 0 0 80 ASCII–CRT (9)

E1 1 1 4 1 130 2741 EBCD (5)
E2 1 1 4 1 130 2741 EBCD (6)
E3 1 1 4 1 130 2741 EBCD (7)
E4 1 1 4 1 130 2741 EBCD (8)

Notes:

(1) Corresponds with Ball Types: 001, 005, 007, 008, 012, 020, 030,
050, 053, 067, 070, and 085. Ball Type code can be found
underneath the locking tab of the ball on an IBM 2741 terminal.

(2) Corresponds with Ball Types: 006, 010, 015, 019, 059, and 090.

(3) Corresponds with Ball Types: 021, 025, 026, 027, 028, 029, 031,
032, 033, 034, 035, 036, 037, 038, 029, 060, 068, 086, 123, 129,
130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 146, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142,
143, 144, 145, 156, and 161.

(4) Corresponds with Ball Types: 043 and 054.

(5) Corresponds with Ball Types: 963, 996, and 998.

(6) Corresponds with Ball Types: 938, 939, 961, 962, and 997.

(7) Corresponds with Ball Types: 942 and 943.

(8) Corresponds with Ball Types: 947 and 948.

(9) Terminal Types D3 and B5 enable Terminal-to-PAD flow control in
the Terminal PAD (TFLOW).

(10) The specific Terminal ID, TI65, incorrect maps to the generic
ID, D2. Since TI 763 and 765 print 80 character per line, users
with these terminals should specify a generic TERM ID of either
D3 (TFLOW enabled) or D1 (TFLOW not specified).



Technical Hacking: Volume One by the Warelock

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^ ^^
^^ Technical Hacking: Volume One ^^
^^ ^^
^^ Written by:The Warelock ^^
^^ SABRE elite ^^
^^ and Lords of Darkness ^^
^^ presentation ^^
^^ ^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
In technical hacking, I will mainly talk about the moret
technicly oriented methods of hacking, phreaking, and other fun stuff… In
this issue I plan to discuss the various protection devices ( filters,
encription devices, and call-back modems ) that large corporations and networks
use to ‘protect’ their computers, I will talk about and describe the various
types of computer (hardware) protection, the way they work, how to surcomvent
them, and other sources of information that may be available on the devices…
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Filters
———-
A filter, a box like contraption that hooks in between the computer and the
phone-line, is used, instead of a password program, toID each user and to
verify his password… Why the companies decided to make a hardware version of
a verification program, I don’t know. For no matter what kind of password
system you use, there are still Users with passwords that make it a pleasure to
hack (love, password, access, sex )…

Sircumventing a Filter: Filters are no harder to get around thatn a good,
secure password system… There are still several default passwords in most
( the usuall “demo” or “test” account) and usuall hacks ( the hack-hack, data
base hack, circumvent hack, call-back hack, etc. All to be discussed in further
volumes) also work… A filter device, though, posseses several interesting
features and failings.. First of all, each filter system is geared for a
sertain number of computers… Thus several computer networks using filters
arent completely protected by the sole device on which they place all their
trust in ‘ protecting ‘ them… For example, several computer networks use a
sertain filter geared toward 4 on-line computer systems, but unfortinately for
them, they needed a fifth on-line computer…oops, there goes the whole syste!
Although they thought that since only a library computer, which doesnt require
security, was on-line (giving out no secret information) it wouldnt compromise
the rest of the system…They were wrong! For from the library computer (which
is already in the operating system, bypassing the filter) one could force the
operating system for the entire mainframe to place you in any of the other
terminals!!!
Finaly, an interesting feature of a filter system: ALL THE PASSWORDS ARE
STORES INSIDE THE MEMORY OF THE FILTER UNIT… therefore, once you are inside
the data base, you could set up a worm program that would slowly but surely
read all of the systems passwords from the filter FROM THE INSIDE!!!

Notes (names of filters, further readings, Aknolodgements):

EnterCept (filter) : USES : a six character ID of any ASCII variables
ComputerSentry : USES : (this one’s a bitch… if you don’t need to get into
the system badly, forget it…) a voice synthesiser thats asks for a touch-tone
ID of a variable number of digits…
DataFlo : USES : a six character ID that both identifies and is used as a Pass
Bay MultiPlex : USES : either a four or six letter/number ID code standar (no
individual ID’s!!! It’s usually this default: 524E )
For further Reading: try Bill Landreths ‘Out of The Inner Circle’, Basic
Telephone Security by an Annonomous author, or you can order specs. and
manuals directly from the company…(see end of text for company names)
—————————————————————————-

Encription/Decryption Devices:
These are instaled directly inside terminals from which a system using this
type of device is called… These are mothers to hack, yet it is not impossible
many people say that once you see an encrypted carier, forget it… Not So!
A lot of times, an appearant encrypted carier is actually a standar modem
using a diffrent parity than your terminal… so fool around with that,
adjusting parity (and make sure you have a good connection, sometimes static
can cause some funny stuff to appear on the screen)and stop bits… besides
that, there’s very little you can do… although if you know the make of
encryption device that the system is using, you may be able to adjust your
term program to correctly modify each character recieved… (for example:
a while back, there was an encryption device that simply added two points to
the ASCII value of each character and then sent it as that character, the
decription device on the other end took each value and subtracted two points
and printed the character! That simple! All I had to do was change my AE
to evaluate each character, subtract the two points, and print the character…
It was incredibly slow, but it worked…)
Notes:
Sherlock Information Systems: USES : An AuthentiKey, it is usually a standard
based on the serial number of the unit… Unless you can find that, it’s a lost
cause…
Super Encryptor II: USES : nearly impossible, a key of about 40-50 characters..
almost impossible to break…
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Call Back Modems:
How these little beuties work is quite simple and was quite effective untill
a quite successfull method was descovered at breaking in… They work in
the following manner: A user calls a modem line, enters an account and ID, the
modem hangs up the line and then, using another line, calls back the authorised
number belonging to the code & ID in it’s memory…
Circumvention: Actually, when you think about it, it turns out quite simply…
The modem usesone line to recieve calls and another to send them out…
the number is usually 1 or digit above the suffix of the number…EX:
(xxx) xxx-0001 The Warelock<-\- X-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-X Another file downloaded from: NIRVANAnet(tm) & the Temple of the Screaming Electron Jeff Hunter 510-935-5845 Rat Head Ratsnatcher 510-524-3649 Burn This Flag Zardoz 408-363-9766 realitycheck Poindexter Fortran 415-567-7043 Lies Unlimited Mick Freen 415-583-4102 Specializing in conversations, obscure information, high explosives, arcane knowledge, political extremism, diversive sexuality, insane speculation, and wild rumours. ALL-TEXT BBS SYSTEMS. Full access for first-time callers. We don't want to know who you are, where you live, or what your phone number is. We are not Big Brother. "Raw Data for Raw Nerves" X-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-X

Technical Hacking Volume 1 by the Warelock

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^ ^^
^^ Technical Hacking: Volume One ^^
^^ ^^
^^ Written by:The Warelock ^^
^^ SABRE elite ^^
^^ and Lords of Darkness ^^
^^ presentation ^^
^^ ^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
In technical hacking, I will mainly talk about the moret
technicly oriented methods of hacking, phreaking, and other fun stuff… In
this issue I plan to discuss the various protection devices ( filters,
encription devices, and call-back modems ) that large corporations and networks
use to ‘protect’ their computers, I will talk about and describe the various
types of computer (hardware) protection, the way they work, how to surcomvent
them, and other sources of information that may be available on the devices…
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Filters
———-
A filter, a box like contraption that hooks in between the computer and the
phone-line, is used, instead of a password program, toID each user and to
verify his password… Why the companies decided to make a hardware version of
a verification program, I don’t know. For no matter what kind of password
system you use, there are still Users with passwords that make it a pleasure to
hack (love, password, access, sex )…

Sircumventing a Filter: Filters are no harder to get around thatn a good,
secure password system… There are still several default passwords in most
( the usuall “demo” or “test” account) and usuall hacks ( the hack-hack, data
base hack, circumvent hack, call-back hack, etc. All to be discussed in further
volumes) also work… A filter device, though, posseses several interesting
features and failings.. First of all, each filter system is geared for a
sertain number of computers… Thus several computer networks using filters
arent completely protected by the sole device on which they place all their
trust in ‘ protecting ‘ them… For example, several computer networks use a
sertain filter geared toward 4 on-line computer systems, but unfortinately for
them, they needed a fifth on-line computer…oops, there goes the whole syste!
Although they thought that since only a library computer, which doesnt require
security, was on-line (giving out no secret information) it wouldnt compromise
the rest of the system…They were wrong! For from the library computer (which
is already in the operating system, bypassing the filter) one could force the
operating system for the entire mainframe to place you in any of the other
terminals!!!
Finaly, an interesting feature of a filter system: ALL THE PASSWORDS ARE
STORES INSIDE THE MEMORY OF THE FILTER UNIT… therefore, once you are inside
the data base, you could set up a worm program that would slowly but surely
read all of the systems passwords from the filter FROM THE INSIDE!!!

Notes (names of filters, further readings, Aknolodgements):
EnterCept (filter) : USES : a six character ID of any ASCII variables
ComputerSentry : USES : (this one’s a bitch… if you don’t need to get into
the system badly, forget it…) a voice synthesiser thats asks for a touch-tone
ID of a variable number of digits…
DataFlo : USES : a six character ID that both identifies and is used as a Pass
Bay MultiPlex : USES : either a four or six letter/number ID code standar (no
individual ID’s!!! It’s usually this default: 524E )
For further Reading: try Bill Landreths ‘Out of The Inner Circle’, Basic
Telephone Security by an Annonomous author, or you can order specs. and
manuals directly from the company…(see end of text for company names)
—————————————————————————-

Encription/Decryption Devices:
These are instaled directly inside terminals from which a system using this
type of device is called… These are mothers to hack, yet it is not impossible
many people say that once you see an encrypted carier, forget it… Not So!
A lot of times, an appearant encrypted carier is actually a standar modem
using a diffrent parity than your terminal… so fool around with that,
adjusting parity (and make sure you have a good connection, sometimes static
can cause some funny stuff to appear on the screen)and stop bits… besides
that, there’s very little you can do… although if you know the make of
encryption device that the system is using, you may be able to adjust your
term program to correctly modify each character recieved… (for example:
a while back, there was an encryption device that simply added two points to
the ASCII value of each character and then sent it as that character, the
decription device on the other end took each value and subtracted two points
and printed the character! That simple! All I had to do was change my AE
to evaluate each character, subtract the two points, and print the character…
It was incredibly slow, but it worked…)
Notes:
Sherlock Information Systems: USES : An AuthentiKey, it is usually a standard
based on the serial number of the unit… Unless you can find that, it’s a lost
cause…
Super Encryptor II: USES : nearly impossible, a key of about 40-50 characters..
almost impossible to break…
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Call Back Modems:
How these little beuties work is quite simple and was quite effective untill
a quite successfull method was descovered at breaking in… They work in
the following manner: A user calls a modem line, enters an account and ID, the
modem hangs up the line and then, using another line, calls back the authorised
number belonging to the code & ID in it’s memory…
Circumvention: Actually, when you think about it, it turns out quite simply…
The modem usesone line to recieve calls and another to send them out…
the number is usually 1 or digit above the suffix of the number…EX:
(xxx) xxx-0001 The Warelock<--

Password Security: A Case History Encryption Computing by Robert Morris and Ken Thompson (April 3, 1978)

Password Security: A Case History Encryption
Computing

Robert Morris

Ken Thompson

ABSTRACT

This paper describes the history of the
design of the password security scheme on a
remotely accessed time-sharing system. The
present design was the result of countering
observed attempts to penetrate the system. The
result is a compromise between extreme security
and ease of use.

April 3, 1978

Password Security: A Case History Encryption
Computing

Robert Morris

Ken Thompson

INTRODUCTION

Password security on the UNIX time-sharing system [1]
is provided by a collection of programs whose elaborate and
strange design is the outgrowth of many years of experience
with earlier versions. To help develop a secure system, we
have had a continuing competition to devise new ways to
attack the security of the system (the bad guy) and, at the
same time, to devise new techniques to resist the new
attacks (the good guy). This competition has been in the
same vein as the competition of long standing between
manufacturers of armor plate and those of armor-piercing
shells. For this reason, the description that follows will
trace the history of the password system rather than simply
presenting the program in its current state. In this way,
the reasons for the design will be made clearer, as the
design cannot be understood without also understanding the
potential attacks.

An underlying goal has been to provide password secu-
rity at minimal inconvenience to the users of the system.
For example, those who want to run a completely open system
without passwords, or to have passwords only at the option
of the individual users, are able to do so, while those who
require all of their users to have passwords gain a high
degree of security against penetration of the system by
unauthorized users.

The password system must be able not only to prevent
any access to the system by unauthorized users (i.e. prevent
them from logging in at all), but it must also prevent users
who are already logged in from doing things that they are
not authorized to do. The so called “super-user” pass-
word, for example, is especially critical because the
super-user has all sorts of permissions and has essentially
unlimited access to all system resources.

_________________________
|- UNIX is a trademark of Bell Laboratories.

– 2 –

Password security is of course only one component of
overall system security, but it is an essential component.
Experience has shown that attempts to penetrate remote-
access systems have been astonishingly sophisticated.

Remote-access systems are peculiarly vulnerable to
penetration by outsiders as there are threats at the remote
terminal, along the communications link, as well as at the
computer itself. Although the security of a password
encryption algorithm is an interesting intellectual and
mathematical problem, it is only one tiny facet of a very
large problem. In practice, physical security of the com-
puter, communications security of the communications link,
and physical control of the computer itself loom as far more
important issues. Perhaps most important of all is control
over the actions of ex-employees, since they are not under
any direct control and they may have intimate knowledge
about the system, its resources, and methods of access.
Good system security involves realistic evaluation of the
risks not only of deliberate attacks but also of casual
unauthorized access and accidental disclosure.

PROLOGUE

The UNIX system was first implemented with a password
file that contained the actual passwords of all the users,
and for that reason the password file had to be heavily pro-
tected against being either read or written. Although his-
torically, this had been the technique used for remote-
access systems, it was completely unsatisfactory for several
reasons.

The technique is excessively vulnerable to lapses in
security. Temporary loss of protection can occur when the
password file is being edited or otherwise modified. There
is no way to prevent the making of copies by privileged
users. Experience with several earlier remote-access sys-
tems showed that such lapses occur with frightening fre-
quency. Perhaps the most memorable such occasion occurred
in the early 60’s when a system administrator on the CTSS
system at MIT was editing the password file and another sys-
tem administrator was editing the daily message that is
printed on everyone’s terminal on login. Due to a software
design error, the temporary editor files of the two users
were interchanged and thus, for a time, the password file
was printed on every terminal when it was logged in.

Once such a lapse in security has been discovered,
everyone’s password must be changed, usually simultaneously,
at a considerable administrative cost. This is not a great
matter, but far more serious is the high probability of such
lapses going unnoticed by the system administrators.

Security against unauthorized disclosure of the

– 3 –

passwords was, in the last analysis, impossible with this
system because, for example, if the contents of the file
system are put on to magnetic tape for backup, as they must
be, then anyone who has physical access to the tape can read
anything on it with no restriction.

Many programs must get information of various kinds
about the users of the system, and these programs in general
should have no special permission to read the password file.
The information which should have been in the password file
actually was distributed (or replicated) into a number of
files, all of which had to be updated whenever a user was
added to or dropped from the system.

THE FIRST SCHEME

The obvious solution is to arrange that the passwords
not appear in the system at all, and it is not difficult to
decide that this can be done by encrypting each user’s pass-
word, putting only the encrypted form in the password file,
and throwing away his original password (the one that he
typed in). When the user later tries to log in to the sys-
tem, the password that he types is encrypted and compared
with the encrypted version in the password file. If the two
match, his login attempt is accepted. Such a scheme was
first described in [3, p.91ff.]. It also seemed advisable
to devise a system in which neither the password file nor
the password program itself needed to be protected against
being read by anyone.

All that was needed to implement these ideas was to
find a means of encryption that was very difficult to
invert, even when the encryption program is available. Most
of the standard encryption methods used (in the past) for
encryption of messages are rather easy to invert. A con-
venient and rather good encryption program happened to exist
on the system at the time; it simulated the M-209 cipher
machine [4] used by the U.S. Army during World War II. It
turned out that the M-209 program was usable, but with a
given key, the ciphers produced by this program are trivial
to invert. It is a much more difficult matter to find out
the key given the cleartext input and the enciphered output
of the program. Therefore, the password was used not as the
text to be encrypted but as the key, and a constant was
encrypted using this key. The encrypted result was entered
into the password file.

ATTACKS ON THE FIRST APPROACH

Suppose that the bad guy has available the text of the
password encryption program and the complete password file.
Suppose also that he has substantial computing capacity at
his disposal.

– 4 –

One obvious approach to penetrating the password
mechanism is to attempt to find a general method of invert-
ing the encryption algorithm. Very possibly this can be
done, but few successful results have come to light, despite
substantial efforts extending over a period of more than
five years. The results have not proved to be very useful
in penetrating systems.

Another approach to penetration is simply to keep try-
ing potential passwords until one succeeds; this is a gen-
eral cryptanalytic approach called key search. Human beings
being what they are, there is a strong tendency for people
to choose relatively short and simple passwords that they
can remember. Given free choice, most people will choose
their passwords from a restricted character set (e.g. all
lower-case letters), and will often choose words or names.
This human habit makes the key search job a great deal
easier.

The critical factor involved in key search is the
amount of time needed to encrypt a potential password and to
check the result against an entry in the password file. The
running time to encrypt one trial password and check the
result turned out to be approximately 1.25 milliseconds on a
PDP-11/70 when the encryption algorithm was recoded for max-
imum speed. It is takes essentially no more time to test
the encrypted trial password against all the passwords in an
entire password file, or for that matter, against any col-
lection of encrypted passwords, perhaps collected from many
installations.

If we want to check all passwords of length n that con-
sist entirely of lower-case letters, the number of such
passwords is $26 sup n$. If we suppose that the password
consists of printable characters only, then the number of
possible passwords is somewhat less than $95 sup n$. (The
standard system “character erase” and “line kill” char-
acters are, for example, not prime candidates.) We can
immediately estimate the running time of a program that will
test every password of a given length with all of its char-
acters chosen from some set of characters. The following
table gives estimates of the running time required on a
PDP-11/70 to test all possible character strings of length
$n$ chosen from various sets of characters: namely, all
lower-case letters, all lower-case letters plus digits, all
alphanumeric characters, all 95 printable ASCII characters,
and finally all 128 ASCII characters.

– 5 –

One has to conclude that it is no great matter for someone
with access to a PDP-11 to test all lower-case alphabetic
strings up to length five and, given access to the machine
for, say, several weekends, to test all such strings up to
six characters in length. By using such a program against a
collection of actual encrypted passwords, a substantial
fraction of all the passwords will be found.

Another profitable approach for the bad guy is to use
the word list from a dictionary or to use a list of names.
For example, a large commercial dictionary contains typi-
callly about 250,000 words; these words can be checked in
about five minutes. Again, a noticeable fraction of any
collection of passwords will be found. Improvements and
extensions will be (and have been) found by a determined bad
guy. Some “good” things to try are:

– The dictionary with the words spelled backwards.

– A list of first names (best obtained from some mailing
list). Last names, street names, and city names also
work well.

– The above with initial upper-case letters.

– All valid license plate numbers in your state. (This
takes about five hours in New Jersey.)

– Room numbers, social security numbers, telephone
numbers, and the like.

The authors have conducted experiments to try to deter-
mine typical users’ habits in the choice of passwords when
no constraint is put on their choice. The results were
disappointing, except to the bad guy. In a collection of
3,289 passwords gathered from many users over a long period
of time;

15 were a single ASCII character;

72 were strings of two ASCII characters;

464 were strings of three ASCII characters;

477 were string of four alphamerics;

706 were five letters, all upper-case or all lower-
case;

– 6 –

605 were six letters, all lower-case.

An additional 492 passwords appeared in various available
dictionaries, name lists, and the like. A total of 2,831,
or 86% of this sample of passwords fell into one of these
classes.

There was, of course, considerable overlap between the
dictionary results and the character string searches. The
dictionary search alone, which required only five minutes to
run, produced about one third of the passwords.

Users could be urged (or forced) to use either longer
passwords or passwords chosen from a larger character set,
or the system could itself choose passwords for the users.

AN ANECDOTE

An entertaining and instructive example is the attempt
made at one installation to force users to use less predict-
able passwords. The users did not choose their own pass-
words; the system supplied them. The supplied passwords
were eight characters long and were taken from the character
set consisting of lower-case letters and digits. They were
generated by a pseudo-random number generator with only $2
sup 15$ starting values. The time required to search (again
on a PDP-11/70) through all character strings of length 8
from a 36-character alphabet is 112 years.

Unfortunately, only $2 sup 15$ of them need be looked
at, because that is the number of possible outputs of the
random number generator. The bad guy did, in fact, generate
and test each of these strings and found every one of the
system-generated passwords using a total of only about one
minute of machine time.

IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FIRST APPROACH

1. Slower Encryption

Obviously, the first algorithm used was far too fast.
The announcement of the DES encryption algorithm [2] by the
National Bureau of Standards was timely and fortunate. The
DES is, by design, hard to invert, but equally valuable is
the fact that it is extremely slow when implemented in
software. The DES was implemented and used in the following
way: The first eight characters of the user’s password are
used as a key for the DES; then the algorithm is used to
encrypt a constant. Although this constant is zero at the
moment, it is easily accessible and can be made
installation-dependent. Then the DES algorithm is iterated
25 times and the resulting 64 bits are repacked to become a
string of 11 printable characters.

– 7 –

2. Less Predictable Passwords

The password entry program was modified so as to urge
the user to use more obscure passwords. If the user enters
an alphabetic password (all upper-case or all lower-case)
shorter than six characters, or a password from a larger
character set shorter than five characters, then the program
asks him to enter a longer password. This further reduces
the efficacy of key search.

These improvements make it exceedingly difficult to
find any individual password. The user is warned of the
risks and if he cooperates, he is very safe indeed. On the
other hand, he is not prevented from using his spouse’s name
if he wants to.

3. Salted Passwords

The key search technique is still likely to turn up a
few passwords when it is used on a large collection of pass-
words, and it seemed wise to make this task as difficult as
possible. To this end, when a password is first entered,
the password program obtains a 12-bit random number (by
reading the real-time clock) and appends this to the pass-
word typed in by the user. The concatenated string is
encrypted and both the 12-bit random quantity (called the
$salt$) and the 64-bit result of the encryption are entered
into the password file.

When the user later logs in to the system, the 12-bit
quantity is extracted from the password file and appended to
the typed password. The encrypted result is required, as
before, to be the same as the remaining 64 bits in the pass-
word file. This modification does not increase the task of
finding any individual password, starting from scratch, but
now the work of testing a given character string against a
large collection of encrypted passwords has been multiplied
by 4096 ($2 sup 12$). The reason for this is that there are
4096 encrypted versions of each password and one of them has
been picked more or less at random by the system.

With this modification, it is likely that the bad guy
can spend days of computer time trying to find a password on
a system with hundreds of passwords, and find none at all.
More important is the fact that it becomes impractical to
prepare an encrypted dictionary in advance. Such an
encrypted dictionary could be used to crack new passwords in
milliseconds when they appear.

There is a (not inadvertent) side effect of this modif-
ication. It becomes nearly impossible to find out whether a
person with passwords on two or more systems has used the
same password on all of them, unless you already know that.

– 8 –

4. The Threat of the DES Chip

Chips to perform the DES encryption are already commer-
cially available and they are very fast. The use of such a
chip speeds up the process of password hunting by three ord-
ers of magnitude. To avert this possibility, one of the
internal tables of the DES algorithm (in particular, the
so-called E-table) is changed in a way that depends on the
12-bit random number. The E-table is inseparably wired into
the DES chip, so that the commercial chip cannot be used.
Obviously, the bad guy could have his own chip designed and
built, but the cost would be unthinkable.

5. A Subtle Point

To login successfully on the UNIX system, it is neces-
sary after dialing in to type a valid user name, and then
the correct password for that user name. It is poor design
to write the login command in such a way that it tells an
interloper when he has typed in a invalid user name. The
response to an invalid name should be identical to that for
a valid name.

When the slow encryption algorithm was first imple-
mented, the encryption was done only if the user name was
valid, because otherwise there was no encrypted password to
compare with the supplied password. The result was that the
response was delayed by about one-half second if the name
was valid, but was immediate if invalid. The bad guy could
find out whether a particular user name was valid. The rou-
tine was modified to do the encryption in either case.

CONCLUSIONS

On the issue of password security, UNIX is probably
better than most systems. The use of encrypted passwords
appears reasonably secure in the absence of serious atten-
tion of experts in the field.

It is also worth some effort to conceal even the
encrypted passwords. Some UNIX systems have instituted what
is called an “external security code” that must be typed
when dialing into the system, but before logging in. If
this code is changed periodically, then someone with an old
password will likely be prevented from using it.

Whenever any security procedure is instituted that
attempts to deny access to unauthorized persons, it is wise
to keep a record of both successful and unsuccessful
attempts to get at the secured resource. Just as an out-
of-hours visitor to a computer center normally must not only
identify himself, but a record is usually also kept of his
entry. Just so, it is a wise precaution to make and keep a
record of all attempts to log into a remote-access time-

– 9 –

sharing system, and certainly all unsuccessful attempts.

Bad guys fall on a spectrum whose one end is someone
with ordinary access to a system and whose goal is to find
out a particular password (usually that of the super-user)
and, at the other end, someone who wishes to collect as much
password information as possible from as many systems as
possible. Most of the work reported here serves to frus-
trate the latter type; our experience indicates that the
former type of bad guy never was very successful.

We recognize that a time-sharing system must operate in
a hostile environment. We did not attempt to hide the secu-
rity aspects of the operating system, thereby playing the
customary make-believe game in which weaknesses of the sys-
tem are not discussed no matter how apparent. Rather we
advertised the password algorithm and invited attack in the
belief that this approach would minimize future trouble.
The approach has been successful.

References

[1] Ritchie, D.M. and Thompson, K. The UNIX Time-Sharing
System. Comm. ACM 17 (July 1974), pp. 365-375.

[2] Proposed Federal Information Processing Data Encryption
Standard. Federal Register (40FR12134), March 17, 1975

[3] Wilkes, M. V. Time-Sharing Computer Systems. American
Elsevier, New York, (1968).

[4] U. S. Patent Number 2,089,603.

The Tempest Method of Data Interception (Needs Editing)

THE TEMPEST METHOD OF COMPUTER DATA INTERCEPTION!
—————–by Al Muick for P-80 Systems, OCT 86———-

Let me begin by a brief history of myself. I spent the better part of six years in Uncle Sam’s Country Club (better known as the US Army) working in the Intelligence and Security Command (better known as the ASA–Army Security Agency). During that time, my primary duties were Cryptology, Cryptologic Intercept, Counterintelligence, and Field First Sergeant (whatta drag!).
What I’m about to tell you comes under the heading of Cryptologic Intercept. Incidently, for those of you in the know, I was stationed at Field Station Augsburg in West Germany (if you’re not in the know, read the book, THE PUZZLE PALACE).
The interception of radiated data from computers and computer terminals is known in the world of the ASA as “TEMPEST.” TEMPEST intercept may be accomplished in several ways. One, is via a mobile van with the commo equipment on board, two is via strategicly stationed intercept sites (Field Station Augsburg) and the third, rarely used, is relay from one site to another.
To run a TEMPEST operation, you will need a good communications receiver, both high frequency and very high frequency with adjustable bandwidths and a VFO. If you plan to just intercept and leave the exploitation of the collected intelligence for later, you will need a HIGH-QUALITY tape deck; not one of those cheap-assed portables, but a high quality deck. If you plan to do the exploitation now or later, you will still need to convert the IF of your communications receiver to a recordable frequency. To do this, simply patch the output of your 1 MHz or below IF to the input plug on your tape deck. If your IF is something above 1 MHz you’re S.O.L unless you have an IF downconverter around or have the ability to construct one. You will, in effect, be recording an RF frequency on your tape deck, vice an audio frequency.
Your tape deck MUST run at either 7 1/2 or 15 i.p.s in order for it to record this signal. You will later play that signal back into your IF for exploitation.
As soon as you have your intercept station (it is best to use a van) set up with receiver, antenna, and recorder, you are ready to engage your intercept target. Most computers are RF shielded these days, so your receiver had better be damn sensitive and have a very selective bandwidth. If you are planning to intercept such a computer, you will need to be outside its building location (if possible). Since we know, most microprocessors operate at frequencies between 2-12 MHz, we will look for the radiated data here in that frequency range. It is here that a spectrum analyzer, connected to your IF output will aid in discerning the signals and binary emissions of your target computer. If you know how to use a spectrum analyzer, it will prove invaluable, but since they are so complicated, I will not attempt to explain their proper use here.
You will simply scan the bands between 2-12 MHz until you find the radiated signal (if you must, go for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc. harmonics if local interference on the primary frequency is too high) and then tune to the spot where it comes in best. Next adjust your bandwidth until you can just hear the signal as pure as day, with very little to no outside interference.
Once you have your target tuned in, you may want to drive around the block or further away, to avoid detection. Remember, not to go too far or you will lose the signal. Mainframe computers (when unprotected) sometimes radiate a signal for 3 to four miles! A typical PC computer will radiate a signal for at least 1/2 mile if unprotected!
You should, by now, have picked your intercept site, have parked the van, and have made sure that you still have your signal coming in at good strength. The next step is easy! Simply connect the output of your low frequency IF to the input of your deck and let ‘er rip! I find that 10″ reels suit this purpose just fine, and you should be able to get at least one or two UIDs or PWs in the amount of time you will have at 7 1/2 or 15 i.p.s. After the tape is done (you may want to record both sides) pack up your gear and head for home!
Once home, you will need another piece of equipment, possibly two. In various surplus magazines, you will see a machine called a “visi-corder” advertised. This is a machine that burns a copy of binary code onto light-sensitive paper. They cost some money, but are basically invaluable. You are now ready for signal exploitation.
You now need to play your recorded tape into the IF input of your communications receiver. The output of your IF will be connected to the IF input on the visi-corder. This will give your the truest binary representation on the paper. If you so desire, you may connect the audio out of your communications receiver to the audio input of the visi-corder. The audio is rectified into DC and then you get a crisp, clear presentation on the paper. But remember this….DC LIES!!! While the representation may be clear, the binary spacing will be off slightly, increasing in error as you continue, until you finally wind up with continuous error.
Assuming you have made the proper connections, get some beer for your relaxation (or them funny l’il pills, or whatever makes you relax….here comes the hair-pulling part). Begin playback of the deck into your receiver and initiate the visi-corder’s print mode. I recommend a medium-fast speed, because if you use slow speed to conserve paper (you cheap fucker!), the bauds will be so close together as to render the paper useless and wou wind up wasting the paper anyway!
At this point, print out about 2 minutes worth of paper. Once the paper is printed, expose it to light so it develops and have several 3×5″ cards handy. As soon as it develops, scan the paper and the binary stream on it for a section that has three or four of the smallest (closest together) bits. This is ASCII. Once you have found the section, place one 3×5″ card at the base of the section and mark off tick marks where each bit stops and ends (on the smallest bits only!!). You are now ready to do what we in the ASA call “bustin’ bauds.”
As you know, one ASCII byte consists of 8 bits. simply start at a reasonable point at the beginning of your interception and begin to mark off tick marks along the binary stream. Even if you come across 1s and 0s that are very wide, mark as many thin ticks from your 3×5″ card on them. This is necessary to break the ASCII code.
The complete 8 bit ASCII code is at the end of this tutorial for your convenience.
Once you have marked off the paper, count off the first eight bits, e.g. 10011101 and refer to the ASCII chart to find a character that fits it. If you can’t find one immediately, don’t despair! Try using the complement of the 8-bit code in front of you (i.e. the reverse of what you’ve decoded. Instead of 10011101, try 01100010.). If you still have not found anything, slide your card over one bit and try to get another byte of ASCII. This time you may come up with 00111010 (complement 11000101). Check it with the table. Remeber, you may have to do this eight times (that is, shift a bit over eight times) before you make any sense out of it. It is long and tedious, but it will pay off in the end.
Note: this is illegal and is punishable under federal law. I assume no responsibility for your actions, and neither does the operator of P-80. This is presented for your information only. If you have any questions, please leave me mail!……happy hacking!….Al Muick.

ASA LIVES FOREVER!!

The 8 bit ASCII code:

(for 7 bit ASCII, simply delete the last bit…it’s not always there…something to keep in mind….al)

BINARY MEANING

00000000 Null
10000000 Start of message
01000000 End of address
11000000 End of message
00100000 End of transmission
10100000 WRU (Who are you?)
01100000 RU (Are you…?)
11100000 Bell (audible signal)
00010000 Format effector
10010000 Horizontal tabulation or skip (for card puncher)
01010000 Line feed
11010000 Vertical tabulation
00110000 Form feed
10110000 Carriage return
01110000 Shift out
11110000 Shift in
00001000 Device control reserved for data link escape
10001000 Device control
01001000 Device Control
11001000 Device Control
00101000 Device control (stop)
10101000 Error
01101000 Synchronous idle
11101000 Logical end of media
10001000 Information separator
10011000 Information separator
01011000 Information separator
11011000 Information separator
11001000 Information separator
11011000 Information separator
11101000 Information separator
11111000 Information separator
00000100 Word separator (space, normally non-printing)
10000100 !
01000100 ”
11000100 #
00100100 $
10100100 %
01100100 &
01110100 ‘
00010100 (
10010100 )
01010100 *
11010100 +
00110100 ,
10110100 –
01110100 .
11110100 /
00001100 0
10001100 1
01001100 2
11001100 3
00101100 4
10101100 5
01101100 6
11101100 7
00011100 8
10011100 9
01011100 :
11011100 ;
00111100 < 10111100 = 01111100 >
11111100 ?
00000010 @
10000010 A
01000010 B
11000010 C
00100010 D
10100010 E
01100010 F
11100010 G
00010010 H
10010010 I
01010010 J
11010010 K
00110010 L
10110010 M
01110010 N
11110010 O
00001010 P
10001010 Q
01001010 R
11001010 S
00101010 T
10101010 U
01101010 V
11101010 W
00011010 X
10011010 Y
01011010 Z
11011010 Left bracket
00111010 Reverse slash bar
10111010 Right bracket
01111010 Up arrow
11111010 Left arrow
00000110 Unassigned
10000110 Unassigned
01000110 Unassigned
11000110 Unassigned
00100110 Unassigned
10100110 Unassigned
01100110 Unassigned
11100110 Unassigned
00010110 Unassigned
10010110 Unassigned
01010110 Unassigned
11010110 Unassigned
00110110 Unassigned
10110110 Unassigned
01110110 Unassigned
11110110 Unassigned
00001110 Unassigned
10001110 Unassigned
01001110 Unassigned
11001110 Unassigned
00101110 Unassigned
10101110 Unassigned
01101110 Unassigned
11101110 Unassigned
00011110 Unassigned
10011110 Unassigned
01011110 Unassigned
11011110 Unassigned
00111110 Acknowledge
10111110 Unassigned control
01111110 Escape
11111110 Delete/Idle

��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

SOFTDOCS: Keytrap v3.0 by Dcypher

                   KEYTRAP v3.0 - Keyboard Key Logger
                      by dcypher (dcypher@mhv.net)

		http://www.mhv.net/~dcypher/keytrap.html

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
THIS PROGRAM MAY NOT BE DISTRIBUTED IN ANY WAY THAT VIOLATES U.S. OR 
FOREIGN LAW.  THIS PROGRAM MUST NOT BE USED TO GAIN UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS 
TO DATA AND IS NOT INTENDED TO HELP USERS TO VIOLATE THE LAW ! 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The author disclaims ALL warranties relating to the program, whether 
express or implied.  In absolutely no event shall the author be liable 
for any damage resulting from the use and/or misuse of this program.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

WHAT IS KEYTRAP ?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
KEYTRAP is a very effective keyboard key logger that will log
keyboard scancodes to a logfile for later conversion to ASCII
characters. Keytrap installs as a TSR, remaining in memory
untill the computer is turned off. Keytrap will NOT work while
you are in windows.

CONVERT will convert the keyboard scancodes captured by Keytrap
to their respective keyboard (ASCII) characters. Convert is now
written in C. Source code is included.

NOTES
~~~~~
Both programs were coded so any modifications to the source codes
could EASILY be made. Both programs are HIGHLY configureable. They
can be easily changed to fit almost ANY dos application you need.
The TSR (Keytrap) is VERY powerful, it will capture keys during
almost anything you run. There are very few ways to defeat it.

Keytrap uses interrupts 9 and 21. Keytraps interrupt 9 ISR is checked
via the interrupt 21 ISR and replaced if need be. You can easily add
many more 9 ISR's if a program decides to take full control of the
9 ISR more then twice, which is VERY unlikely. Very few programs take
full control of ISR 9.

Keytrap will not display ANY messages. Check the logfile and 
the size of the logfile if your not sure Keytrap is working. 

Keytrap will only make the logfile hidden if the logfile is
actually created by Keytrap or the maximum size of the logfile
is reached or exceeded. If you specify a file that already
exists then Keytrap will not change that files attributes and 
will append all scancode data to the end of the file.

Keytrap will not crash if the logfile gets deleted while Keytrap
is in memory. It will just keep looking for the logfile so it can
write its buffer. A buffer write is not forced untill the buffer
reaches 400 bytes. It will then try to write its buffer during 
the next interrupt 21 call.

If you have any questions or need some help, e-mail me.

dcypher <dcypher@mhv.net>